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Interoperability and Information Sharing
Sean P. Varano38 and Thomas J. Dover39

Communication and information sharing are two of the most pressing issues facing the
public safety community today. In previous chapters of this volume, authors have made note of
the changing public safety landscape as it relates to the need for enhanced information and
intelligence sharing among a broad cross-section of organizations. Public safety organizations,
particularly law enforcement agencies, have been quick to adopt emerging technologies that have
allowed for greater communication and information sharing capacities. While substantial
improvements have been made over the decades that enhanced communication and information
sharing, many challenges remain in the move to seamlessly integrated communication capacities.
The key challenge in the upcoming decades relates to the technical and cultural changes
necessary to achieve integrated communication systems. There is no shortage of resources given
to increasing the communications capacity of the public safety community, yet serious
challenges remain in the degree of interoperability within and across public safety domains.
Interoperability has in many ways become the defining issue in the arenas of communications
and information sharing. This chapter will provide an overview of critical historical events that
placed questions of interoperability and information sharing on the national agenda. The chapter
will also provide an overview of national models for information sharing.

Background
The September 11th, 2001 terrorism attacks as well Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005
put the challenges associated with the interoperability of communication systems across the
public safety landscape in the public spotlight. On the morning of September 11th, 2001 law
enforcement, fire, medical, military and private security personnel from the New York City
region, as well as, countless numbers of private citizens responded to the unfolding tragedy in
the World Trade Center towers in lower Manhattan. The sheer volume of personnel responding
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to the WTC theatre to provide assistance to those in need serves as one of the defining moments
in American history. What quickly became apparent on that fateful morning was that the public
safety apparatus in and around New York City was woefully underprepared for the tragedy that
was unfolding right before their eyes.
The after-action reports that resulted from this tragedy revealed what was otherwise
widely known among many sectors of the public safety community, namely, that serious
problems existed within the local and regional communication systems that resulted in a
systemic communications failure around the WTC theatre. The radio system used by the Fire
Department of New York (FDNY), for example, was inadequate in terms of technical capacity to
reach all of the locations throughout the WTC theatre (911 Report, 322). Their radio system was
not capable of reaching the upper floors of several of the WTC towers due to the sheer size of the
buildings and the density of the concrete and other building materials. The myriad of public and
private agencies responding to the attacks also used a variety of different communications
technologies that were not easily adaptable (McKinsey Report, 2008). In the end, a critical part
of the overall WTC tragedy was that the response could have been more effective had proper
training and equipment standards been established.
On that same fateful day, those responding to the crash site at the Pentagon experienced
much of the same shock and horror as their counterparts in New York. Damage and chaos
created a similar sense of panic and need for an immediate regional response across multiple
emergency response systems. The response in Washington, DC metropolitan area, however,
unfolded differently than those in New York. The DC metro area had a long history of planned
exercises in response to anticipated natural and manmade disasters. As part of these exercises, a
wide range of federal, state, and local first responders had extensive and well established
protocols for responding to such events. Of notable importance, these agencies had protocols in
place for dealing with the well-known problems associated with interoperability (Arlington
County, 2002). While the Pentagon was plagued by challenges in responding to the
unprecedented attack, there were far fewer problems associated with the overall communications
capacity and interoperability across agencies. Compared to their counterparts in New York, there
was an overall sense that the communication among the responders, particularly in terms of the
interoperability and coverage of their systems, to this event was largely effective.
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The systemic problems caused by a lack of interoperability within and across public
safety sectors emerged as a critical area needing attention by federal, state, and local
policymakers in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In an effort to prevent similar problems in the
future, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had implemented national efforts to
enhance interoperability limitations by 2004. The broader policymaking community became
acutely aware of what had been known for decades among many first responders;
interoperability problems were not unique to New York but instead plagued most regions of the
country. As Bitto (2007, p. 460) observed, ―[n]ot only is the interoperability problem not novel,
but it [ ] seems that each time a major emergency exposes the lack of interoperability, a new blue
ribbon commission is convened to study the issue.‖ Several notable interoperability
achievements were announced by DHS by September 2004 that were argued to substantially
enhance emergency responses by first responders. The following are some of the most notable
accomplishments outlined in this report along with brief descriptions (Department of Homeland
Security, 2004):


Created central office within Homeland Security for interoperability: The Department
of Homeland Security‘s Office of Interoperability and Compatibility was created as part of
the Science and Technology directorate. This office was charged with coordinating federal
government activities relating to research and development as well as technical assistance
and training as it relates to interoperability.



Developed statement of Technical Requirements: DHS established the first national
Statement of Requirements (SoR) for Wireless Public Safety Communications and
Interoperabilityi. The intent of the standards is to aid the country‘s estimated 50,000 public
safety agencies in defining future interoperability requirements for both voice and data
communications.



Assisted states in acquiring the necessary funding to improve interoperability: The
federal government provided over $280 million in federal funding from 2001-2004 to
specifically address the challenges of interoperability across the broad range of public safety
agencies.



Established Federal Interagency Coordinating Committee: This council was designed to
coordinate all federal efforts geared toward addressing issues of interoperability. More
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specifically, the intent was to coordinate efforts directed at grants, technical assistance
programs for state and local activities, and federal efforts at regulating airwaves.
These are a few of the federal, state, and local efforts specifically designed to address the
problems associated with interoperability. There was a sense by some by early 2005 that the
nation had made substantial progress in its efforts to create a more integrated communications
system that facilitated interoperability (Department of Homeland Security, 2005). By early
2005, there was a general sense that substantial progress had been made.
While communities across the nation made some notable improvements in the area of
interoperability and enhanced communication, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August 2005
clearly demonstrated substantial improvements were still necessary. The sheer magnitude of the
physical destruction in addition to the large geography posed significant challenges. An after
action report revealed that
Hurricane Katrina destroyed an unprecedented portion of the core communication
infrastructure throughout the Gulf Coast region. [T]he storm debilitated 911
emergency call centers, disrupting local emergency services… More than 50,000
utility poles were toppled in Mississippi alone….The complete devastation of the
communication infrastructure left emergency responders and citizens without a
reliable network across which they could coordinate. (The White House, 2006,
55).

The after action went on to later identify basic standards for operability and interoperability as
one of the core recommendations coming out of Katrina (Ibid, 97). Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
however, demonstrated full well that nationally, the United States had still fallen very short of
reaching the necessary communications capacity to effectively respond to large scale disasters.
As Tom Kean, co-chair of the 9/11 Commission Report noted, ―On Sept. 11, people died because
police officers couldn‘t talk to firemen…Katrina was a re-enactment of the same problem. It is
really hard to believe this has not been fixed‖ (Careless, 2006).
The question remains as to why interoperability, a highly technical issue that seemingly
could be fixed through the application of proven technologies, remains such a critical challenge.
Some have argued that the problem of interoperability is less a technical but more cultural in
nature. As McKay (2010) points out, ―[Members of agency A] doesn‘t talk to agency B because
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they two aren‘t really familiar with each other – or maybe they just don‘t want to talk. Even
when there‘s a new, multimillion-dollar system, agency personnel revert to previous behavior.‖
New technology, even when implemented well, sometimes amounts to little more than a ―$100
million doorstop‖ (Ibid.). As those across the vast public safety community try to break down
the cultural barriers that often thwart effective communication and interoperable systems, many
technical challenges remain. The following section outlines key initiatives that have been
implemented to enhance information sharing and communication among a diverse set of
stakeholders. Particular emphases are given to national programs that are intended to foster
collaborative working relationships between public safety entities that not only create
frameworks for information sharing and access, but also break down the cultural barriers that
impede coordination.

Current Practices Fostering Interoperability
There have been a number of measures employed by local, state, and federal agencies to
promote inter-agency communication and flow of information. These efforts include increasing
the ability of police, fire, and rescue communication systems to span the gap between
jurisdictions, merging resources to provide regional based specializations, and integrating of
information collection and dissemination practices. The common goal of all of these efforts has
been to provide correct and accurate data to those persons who can contextualize the information
and operationalize investigative leads, actionable intelligence, or functional recommendations.
Moreover, they are intended to build effective working relationships among agencies that may
have limited histories sharing information or developing local, state, or regional data sharing
strategies. The goal of these programs is to break down the traditional ―silo‖ approaches whereby
individual agencies or public safety sectors (e.g., police, fire, private security) operate either
independently, or worse yet, with a sense of antagonism. The following section then outlines
some of the efforts by local, state, and federal agencies to integrate their information gathering
and dissemination capabilities. Several of these strategies were incorporated in a post 9/11
environment where the flow of information has trumped jurisdictional disputes and necessitated
inter-jurisdictional cooperation.
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Critical Incident Reviews
There are at least two distinct types of critical incident reviews (CIR). The first is the
process whereby agencies responding to a particular incident or set of incidents implement a
post-hoc review process with the intent of evaluating the overall quality of the response. The
primary purpose of the review process is to identify breakdowns in the response and develop
protocols for eliminating problems in the future. The second type of CIR relates to information
sharing related to a particular case or investigation. This second CIR model has been developed
under the auspices of the federally funded Project Safe Neighborhoods in places like Rochester,
NY (see Klofas, Hipple, McDevitt, Bynum, McGarrell, and Decker, 2006).
The first CIR model is part of evaluating agency preparedness, evaluating the ongoing
operational aspects of response and containment, and evaluating post event activities. Arguably,
CIRs should be standard operating procedure in any critical incident response. This is especially
true due to the potential for civil liability issues, and potential for wide spread, knee-jerk policy
responses. CIRs provide agencies with an opportunity to effectively evaluate and critique the
incident response. It also assures the public that the agencies involved are doing everything they
can to understand the dynamics of the incident, how it led to successes and failures, and how to
enhance responses in the future. They represent an important feedback loop that is essential to
continued response improvement.
CIRs assess the contribution of each component involved in responding to the incident in
terms of that component‘s role and effectiveness. These components will of course differ
depending on the incident, but may generally include initial emergency response, command and
control, information collection, information dissemination, collateral containment, media
services, and post event follow-up. The purpose of a critical incident review is to understand
what did and did not work, and provide reasonable and measured recommendations for further
training, resources, and policy. Aspects of data sharing and communication barriers, including
problems associated with interoperability, often lie at the core of these efforts. CIRs provide a
real life contextual understanding of the significance of the challenges individuals and agencies
directly involved in incidents experienced. These events provide a capacity to move the
discussion out of the hypothetical into the practical, from the probable into the actual.
In providing an effective evaluation, it is imperative that the politics of the situation be
kept at a minimum. Finger-pointing and inter-jurisdictional bickering serves no purpose. Thus,
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an important consideration of any CIR is identifying the review team. This manuscript will not
make any recommendations as to how to assemble a review team other than to suggest that the
team should be as objective as possible, incorporate both self-assessment, and third party
assessment, and operate autonomously without political pressure from any of the involved
agencies. Most importantly, the team should be comprised of individuals with leadership
responsibilities who are capable of creating an environment of leadership and positive selfreflection.
The second CIR model involves ongoing information sharing among a broad group of
stakeholders related to a particular event or a series of events. There is a long and wellestablished parochial tradition in the public safety community whereby organizations and
individuals within organizations are generally not inclined to share information or draw in a
cross-section of stakeholders to assist in individual investigations that might fall outside of their
individual jurisdiction (Dawes, Birkland, Tayi, & Schneider, 2004). In fact, it is not uncommon
to find that there is little information sharing between individual units within larger police
departments that investigate shared problems. For example, an outside observer might be amazed
to learn in larger, more complex police departments, it is rare for a homicide detective to
collaborate with a narcotics detective when working homicide cases involving drug dealers.
Moreover, it is equally as likely that agencies operating in close proximity share very little
intelligence as it relates to particular investigations even when they share a common ―client‖
base.
Incident specific CIRs are being used increasingly more by police departments around the
nation as coordinated strategies for solving specific cases. They represent one of the more
innovative strategies for sharing information on specific crimes, usually homicide or similarly
serious crimes, in local criminal justice communities. The purpose of the reviews is to assist
localities solve individual crimes and enhance local or regional responses to crime in general
(Klofas et. al, 2006). While this type of CIR is not new per se, a more formalized and
deliberative strategy for information sharing has emerged in communities across the nation
participating in the federally funded Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative (see www.psn.gov).
In the most straightforward example, CIRs involve on-going meetings with a group of
key stakeholders organized around information sharing. The identified stakeholders often come
from a wide range of organizations, but in the typical example, the inclusion of particular
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representatives is tied directly to their capacity to provide direct assistance in the investigation.
Participants often involve representatives from federal law enforcement agencies, state agencies
(e.g., state police, Department of Corrections, and Parole), and other county or local agencies
(e.g., Probation and other local police departments). Those organizing CIRs are also encouraged
to consider selecting participants from different specializations within individual agencies.
Individuals, for example, may be selected from different investigative units (e.g., Vice,
homicide, and narcotics), from different levels of an organization (e.g., patrol), and those with
highly specialized expertise (e.g., ballistic experts).
While this description of stakeholders represents a model fostering communication and
information sharing within an organization or small network of agencies, the basic model is one
of scale and scope. Thus, it can be extended to a variety of problems and situations. The review
process itself takes on many different forms. In the end, the primary purpose is for the
stakeholders to bring as much tangible intelligence to the table about individuals involved in
events, specifics of locations, and to generally draw a connection between what appears to be
disparate facts.
―It is in that combination of professionals with different training and experience
that the potential of incident review is found. [ ] The goal of the incident review
is for a group of experts to combine two different sets of knowledge and
skills…so that the result is an understanding of the crime problem that supports
the development of a strategic plan to help prevent those types of crimes‖ (Klofas
et al., 2006, 4).

The most effective solutions to interoperability and information sharing have, and will
continue to, come from well informed and crafted CIRs of both types outlined above.

Memorandums of Understanding
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is a formalized inter-jurisdictional agreement
to share resources. Generally, speaking if multiple agencies identify the need to pool funds for
regional equipment needs, for example air support, an MOU is drawn up identifying the
personnel and budgetary obligations of the contributing agencies. MOUs have also been used
quit effectively in inter-agency agreements to share data. They can be one of the most straight
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forward and simplistic strategies for starting a formal partnership between two or more agencies.
Most importantly, MOUs establish the protocols for the relationship and establishes a clear
understanding of the mutual expectations.
MOU‘s can be an effective starting point for developing shared information and
communication systems. At the state or regional level, MOUs may serve as a starting point for
drawing consensus around a strategic vision for communication systems that help guide the
technology investment decisions among stakeholder agencies moving forward. Developing
MOUs in the absence of tactical emergencies and/or impending funding creates a better
opportunity create agreements that are both mutually beneficial but also more likely to achieve
their intended goals. This type of pre-crisis and pre-funding planning is generally more
deliberative and creates a better framework if and when resource investments are made. Access
to resources sometimes emerges quickly, possibly caused by a failed system or new grant
opportunity. These situations often require quick action to develop requirements documents,
identify vendors, and select technology. Those responsible for performing these functions may
lack specific expertise in these areas. Absent a plan that articulates shared values and established
standards, it is likely that new systems will fail to meet the desired level of interoperability.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces
The first Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) was established in New York City in 1980.
Currently there are 100 cities nationwide that maintain a JTTF. Sixty-five of these JTTFs were
established as a direct response to the national terrorism threat following 9/11. A JTTF is a small
cell ―… of highly trained, locally based, passionately committed investigators, analysts, linguists,
SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.‖ii The JTTFs were created to address short comings in information flow between local
state and federal agencies, and to give regional support to domestic intelligence gathering
requirements.
One of the advantages of the JTTF approach is the use of local, and state law
enforcement entities to provide regional snapshots of domestic terrorist activity that can be
further synchronized at a national level. JTTFs utilize local, state, and federal law enforcement
personnel that, in all likelihood, already have a working relationship based on other regional
crime issues. In addition, JTTFs provide a structure that can be effectively applied to collect
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intelligence and combat other forms of complex criminal activity (often identified as peripheral
to terrorist activity) to include organized crime, narcotics, and murder. The JTTF model creates
an infrastructure for coordinated, collective action and information sharing.
JTTFs represent an excellent opportunity to develop shared agreements about information
sharing protocols, demonstrate the need and value of information sharing that helps break down
institutional barriers against information sharing, and pilot what works within the context of the
current system. JTTF are generally more proactive and less reactive, and thus, are better
positioned to pilot technologies and to build the business case that justifies their need. The
individual cases or threats addressed by the JTTF then create the real-life opportunities to model
shared information and communication systems. Just as importantly, there is often the
possibility that resources might be available to pilot emerging technologies on a smaller scale.

Fusion Centers
As a means to synthesize and analyze data coming from JTTFs and other regional
sources, several states have established fusion centers. These fusion centers act as command and
control centers to handle and disseminate information and intelligence on a state or multi-state
level. Fusion Centers are staffed by agency representatives from a variety of regional law
enforcement and emergency service agencies.
The FBI participates in the information-sharing environment (IEO) fostered by state
fusion centers by assigning Field Intelligence Group (FIG) analysts and agents to leading
regional fusion centers as provided by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. To assess the need for FBI involvement in a state fusion center,
The field office SAC assesses the maturity of the fusion center by asking the following
questions:

1. Does it have a facility and connectivity to local systems?
2. Will multiple agencies commit full-time personnel?
3. Is the fusion center attempting to meet the Global Justice Guidelines?
4. Does the fusion center cover a significant region or metropolitan area?
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If the fusion center meets the aforementioned criteria, then the FBI participation is
mandatory. If the fusion centers are not mature enough to warrant full-time FBI personnel
assignment, the SAC is directed to establish an effective and robust connectivity allowing
for effective two-way exchange of intelligence.iii

The primary role of FBI personnel in a JTTF and/or fusion center environment is to:

1. Establish a gateway/connectivity between the FBI and the federal, state, local, and
tribal partners across all investigative programs.

2. Provide an effective two-way flow of information through the intelligence cycle (e.g.,
requirements, taskings, intelligence, and feedback) between the fusion center and the
FBI.

3. Participate as an investigative/analytic partner in uncovering, understanding, reporting,
and responding to threats.

4. Ensure the timely two-way flow of terrorism-related threat information between the
fusion center and the local JTTF and FIG.

All terrorism information and intelligence generated from the fusion center/FIG
relationship will continue to be directed to the JTTFs. The JTTFs remain the recognized
and designated environment for which federal to local operational partnerships take place
to detect, investigate, and disrupt terrorist threats or pursue perpetrators.iv
In many ways, Fusion Centers represent the perfect laboratories to model and pilot data
and radio communication technologies. Fusion Centers are specifically mandated to draw data
from disparate data sources and to rationalize their meaning. To accomplish this, there is a need
for enhanced technologies to facilitate this, but also for building the individual and
organizational relationships that make it happen. These relationships often do not develop
naturally. Moreover, it is not uncommon for antagonism to exist that discourages such
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coordination. Historical turf battles or personality disputes within and between agencies are
powerful impediments against information sharing and shared technology visions.
Information Sharing in Action: FBI‘s ViCAP Program
In the early 1980‘s the FBI realized that ―linkage blindness‖v was an underlying
impediment to the successful resolution of serial murder cases in general. It was further
determined that a means to collect, collate, and disseminate case data on homicides and rapes
that appeared to be serial in nature would potentially increase case solvability by linking
agencies and providing cross-jurisdictional leads. Thus, the FBI‘s Violent Criminal
Apprehension Program (ViCAP) was created as a central repository for murder, rape, missing
person, and unidentified human remains cases from across the United States.
In its earliest form, ViCAP existed as a standalone system operating out of the basement
of the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Cases were submitted in a hard copy format to data
entry clerks who would hand enter cases, and if appropriate, search the database for similar types
of cases based on modus operandi. Soon it became apparent that local agencies could expedite
the entry of cases into ViCAP by entering their own cases into a local agency stand-alone copy
of ViCAP and then sending them, first by floppy disk and then, as technology allowed, via email,
to the ViCAP Unit. These cases were then uploaded into the national database. At the time, the
national database existed on servers within the ViCAP Unit and the national database was
searchable only by ViCAP analysts.
Web-based technology has made sharing the ViCAP national database with local, state
and federal agencies technologically feasible. Therefore, ViCAP changed from an internal FBI
database to a truly interoperable database that can be shared with all submitting agencies. By
early fall, 2008, the ViCAP system became a web-based database operating through the Law
Enforcement Online (LEO) website.
The ViCAP national database is an example of how the collection, storage, and
dissemination of data can be facilitated in an online environment. This move toward information
sharing will result in a reduction of data entry by ViCAP analysts, and an increase in case
submissions and inter-jurisdictional case-awareness by local, state, and federal agencies.
Furthermore, this interoperability allows investigators and analysts from local, state, and federal
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agencies to perform their own analysis using national data, and thereby identify other agencies
that may be stakeholders in a particular series.
Like other models presented above, ViCAP represents an opportunity to develop the
business case and technological capacity to share information among agencies. In many ways,
ViCAP represents an integrated intelligence system that draws data elements from a variety of
sources, identifies common characteristics, and creates linkages between events that otherwise
appear distinct. The general inability of the public and private sectors to do this lies at the heart
of the 9/11 Commission Report that detailed how those tragic events occurred even after multiple
indicators were observed across the broad array of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. It
was evident that agencies had long histories of organizational competition, and that few effective
practices were in place. ViCAP and similar programs continue to represent promising strategies
for modeling new approaches.

Other Data Sharing Strategies
An integral part of any interoperability paradigm is the idea that data must be shared with
those who can contextualize it, analyze it, and then create investigative leads, actionable
intelligence, and operational recommendations from it. Regardless of the data to be collected,
the data requirements for intelligence gathering must be understood and established across those
agencies participating in the effort. Similar formats, collection strategies and requirements for
reliability, validity, timeliness, and accuracy should all be well established to facilitate ease of
integration and analysis.
Often one of the greatest impediments to interoperability of data is the variation in
underlying database structures utilized by different record management systems from different
agencies. This issue alone is often one of the key justifications for a complete lack of
information sharing. While it is not reasonable to expect all agencies to change their internal
records system and data management to the same regional or national interoperability scheme, it
is important to recognize that compatibility is important. Many agencies have invested hundreds
of thousands, if not millions of dollars in a functional records management system that meets
their needs. However, the ability to export this data or portions of this data, into a standard
format that can be shared with other agencies is important to the concept of interoperability.
Furthermore, this data extraction should be automated and pulled directly from the agencies
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native records management system, so as not to necessitate duplication of entry (which can
easily result in errors and wasted man hours). A history of investment in one type of technology
or a given ―system‖ may discourage movement to a different system even if the alternative is
superior. Key policymakers might perceive that movement to new technologies after historical
investment in others is a sign of failed leadership or squandered resources.

Future Practices in Interoperability
Interoperability and information sharing will continue to be key features of enhanced
homeland security efforts in the coming decades. Communities will continue to be pushed to
enhance interoperability and move toward seamless communication and information sharing.
The federal government has helped to propel the interoperability concern to the forefront of
public safety planning. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, has funded
Interoperability Coordinator positions for many states across the nation in an effort to establish a
single point of contact for voice-and-data based interoperability concerns. While many states are
still in the infancy stage in terms of their progress toward large-scale interoperability, the
groundwork continues to be laid.
One of the more interesting examples of cutting edge efforts directed at seamless
information sharing and community is the Law Enforcement Online (www.leo.gov) system
funded by the Federal Bureau of Investigations. As a digital networking site, LEO is an elastic
system that permits approved users to create and manage secured digital discussion boards and
intelligence sharing sites. Among other functionality, LEO also functions as a portal of sorts
whereby authorized users can access to access a variety of national data sources such as a JTTF
site, Function Center data, or other national databases. Authorized users, for example, may not
only be granted access to the ViCAP system but can allow users investigating cases thought to be
linked to form integrated discussion groups. There are numerous examples of threads dedicated
to ongoing major case investigations where personnel who are currently working on the case can
post information, maps, diagrams, photos or anything else that needs to be shared with the
community of stake-holders in the investigation. This represents a true paradigm shift in how
multi-jurisdictional investigations are managed. Moreover, it represents a first of its kind virtual
public safety community.
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It will be imperative for public and private sector public safety entities to continue
progress that has begun in recent years. Experience suggests, however, that the most substantial
hurdles that will have to be overcome are less about technical capacities than about the cultural
impediments that can threaten even the most well-funded effort.
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